Final Architecture Specification of security, privacy, and incentive
  mechanisms by Kuntze, Nicolai et al.
Project no. 223850
NANODATACENTERS
Deliverable D3.2: Final Architecture Specification of security,
privacy, and incentive mechanisms
Due date of deliverable: 31st October 2009
Submission date: 6th November 2009
Instrument STREP
Start date of project May 1st 2008
Duration 36 months
Organisation name of
lead contractor for this
deliverable:
SIT
Revision v1.0
Authors
Nicolai Kuntze, Ju¨rgen Repp, Hervais Simo
Fhom, Andreas Fuchs, Ine-Saf Benaissa
Abstract
In this document, we define the NADA security architecture based on refined
use case scenarios, a derived high level model and security analysis. For the
architecure design and verification we are applying the well known STRIDE
model.
Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Seventh
Framework Programme
Dissemination Level
PU Public X
PP
Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission
Services)
RE
Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Com-
mission Services)
CO
Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Com-
mission Services)
1
ar
X
iv
:0
91
1.
33
43
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
7 N
ov
 20
09
Contents
1 Introduction 4
2 Use Scenarios 4
2.1 Used Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Putting Node into Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 App Slice Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 User Requests - Content Download . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 Monitoring as Support for Operation and Management Tasks 11
2.5.1 Low-cost resources (re-) allocation . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.2 Proactive and automatic detection of anomalies and
load peaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.3 Isolation management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Security Requirements and assumptions 13
3.1 Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2 Security Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 High level model 16
4.1 Node architecture model and interactions . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2 Security Mechanisms for the NaDa Monitoring Architecture . 17
4.2.1 Internal Security and Access Control Mechanisms . . . 17
4.2.2 Internal Monitoring Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2.3 External Security Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.4 External Monitoring Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Threat Models 25
5.1 STRIDE methodology and architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1.1 Differences to STRIDE Methodology . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1.2 External Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1.3 DFDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2 Abstract functional system model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6 Conclusion 49
2
List of Figures
1 Overview Node Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Overlay Net Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 High level architecture for the distribution of content . . . . . 17
4 High level architecture for the measurement . . . . . . . . . . 18
5 Node Intermal Security Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6 Internals Monitoring Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7 Extended NaDa Monitoring Service Architecture . . . . . . . 22
8 External Monitoring Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9 Workflow for modified STRIDE Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10 DFDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11 Measure Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
12 Use case 1: End User request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
13 Use case 2: Content Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
List of Tables
1 Mapping STRIDE Threats to DFD Element Types . . . . . . 27
2 DFD Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 Threats to the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4 High Level Mitigation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5 NaDa Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5 NaDa Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6 NaDa Mitigation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6 NaDa Mitigation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6 NaDa Mitigation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7 Assigned Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7 Assigned Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7 Assigned Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7 Assigned Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7 Assigned Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7 Assigned Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7 Assigned Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7 Assigned Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7 Assigned Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7 Assigned Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3
1 Introduction
Distribution of virtual goods over the IP based infrastructure offered by the
Internet requires efficient techniques w.r.t. to the utilization of the existing
resources. One approach here applies methods from the peer to peer domain
to ensure that the required traffic mostly is situated in the cost efficient
last mile. This paper presents this approach and discusses the security
implications.
The proposed security and trust architecture includes solutions for in-
tegrity protection of data as well as for software on the device, exclusion of
manipulated nodes from the network, and isolation between owned appli-
cations by different stakeholders residing in parallel on the same platform.
All solutions can be build on existing secure hardware anchors as provided
by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and its certification infrastructure.
This document presents
Use Case Scenarios The scenarios are defining the operations of the sys-
tem that are to be covered by the resulting architecture. The scenarios
are inputs for the threat analysis and provide the reference of the se-
curity architecture.
High level Model Derived from the scenarios given in this document and
D2.1 high level scenarios are defined introducing the stakeholders, en-
tities, and interactions between them. This document provides an
update to D3.1 [13] as it is included in the joint deliverable D1.1-D3.1
[12][13].
Threat Analysis Given the scenarios the threat analysis provides threats
to be covered by the security analysis and therefore also a reference
for the evaluation planed to be done in D3.4. [14].
Security Architecture The resulting security architecture is presented in
a threat model according to the STRIDE model.
2 Use Scenarios
For the NaDa security architecture the following use scenarios are consid-
ered. The selection of the use scenarios was done according to D1.1 [12][13]
supporting the basic operations required to run the NaDa system. Deploy-
ment of nodes and slices are the basic operations required to establish the
service at the node side. The handling of user requests provides basic func-
tionality towards the end user. Monitoring provides essential information
required for control and QoE enforcement.
This chapter first introduces the used terms and NaDa primitives to
provide for a common definition of vocabulary in the security model and
architecture. After this the use scenarios are introduced.
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2.1 Used Terms
This subsection explains terms used to describe security relevant control
messages in the NaDa security architecture.
APP ID Identifier for a certain customer application which is running in
slice assigned by the customer itself.
Customer ID Unambiguously identifier for a certain customer assigned by
ISP.
Node Managment ID Identifier for NaDa NodeManagement, must be
different from all Customer IDs.
APP Slice ID Tuple (Customer ID, APP ID)
NaDa Resource ID Tuple (Node Management ID, nil) or
APP Slice ID
NaDa Register Registration Message sent from NaDaNode to
NaDaManagement after booting the node.
NaDa Meta Data is used for the following purposes:
• Meta data describing the NaDa Content to be shared, the cor-
responding locations, and the tracker. Information whether loca-
tions reside in the ISP domain or in the NaDa network and the
fingerprint of the content must be part of the meta file and the
meta file has to be signed by the ISP.
• Request for measurement data collected by NodeMonitoring
App Slice Policy defines access rights to AppSlices based on the
NaDa Resource ID. Finer granularity of access rights has to be im-
plemented by the customer if necessary.
App Slice Configuration includes key for encyption of the corresponding
NodeStore, and App Slice Policy.
App Slice Data Data stored in TrustedDataStore assigned to a cer-
tain AppSlice (App Slice Configuration). It also includes moni-
toring data. Any access to such data will require to unseal the
TrustedDataStore.
NaDa Configure Command sent from NaDaManagement to
NodeManagement to configure AppSlices. It requires following
parameters:
• App Slice Policy
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• Fingerprint of AppSlice
• Command: activate / deactivate / restart AppSlice
NaDa Content describes both AppSlice to be installed, with the corre-
sponding policy as well as control data of P2P protocol.
App Content Content distributed by the customer and control data of the
customer protocols.
App User Request Command sent from User to AppSlice. The format of
this data has to be described in the NaDa user interface specification.
App User Response Response sent from AppSlice to UI-User Interface (a
module of the NodeManagement). The format of this data has to be
described in the NaDa user interface specification.
NaDa Log (time stamp, action / measurement) produces a log entries
for certain actions or measuring data. Actions and measurements are
digitally signed by NodeManagement relying on trusted time stamps.
Log Request Command send from AppSlice to NodeManagement to re-
quest (Monitoring) measurement data. NaDa Log is used when cre-
ating the request message.
Log Response Response sent from NodeManagement to AppSlice to for-
ward information (e.g. Monitoring data) to AppSlice. NaDa Log is
used when creating the response message.
NaDa Primitives describe security relevant actions executed by NaDa
Nodes, especially those relevant for communication between entities in dif-
ferent trust boundaries. The primitives will process certain protocols, and
compute or access security relevant data. Figure 1 gives an overview of the
security mechanisms realized by the these primitives. All stored data will
be encrypted. Configuration of the NaDa Node and access of AppSlices to
resources is controlled by the NodeManagment. Communication between
NaDaNodes is performed through overlay nets of the individual customers.
Authentication and computation of keys for encryption in the overlay net is
realized based on trusted P2P protocol presented in [7].
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Figure 1: Overview Node Security Architecture
• NaDa Authentication (NaDaManagement) Realizes the authenti-
cation and attestation described in [7] and provides a symmetric
key for the encryption of communication between the participating
entities. NaDa Authentication is also executed after reception of
NaDa Meta Data e.g. for establish a encrypted connection to re-
spond requests for measurement data.
• NaDa Get T icket (NodeManagement, 2nd
node,NaDa Resource ID) realizes the the delivery of the trusted
ticket (step 1 in MSC Figure 4 of the trusted P2P protocol) to
NodeManagement which can be used for communication with a
second NaDa Node.
• Node Authentication (2nd node) Ticket obtained by
NaDa Get T icket is used for authentication to second node. After
attestation of the second node a symmetric key for the encryption of
the communication between the two nodes is computed. “resource”
used in MSC Figure 4 of the trusted P2P protocol addresses the
corresponding overlay net. The policy (App Slice Policy) for access
to the overlay net has to be checked.
• NaDa Connect(2nd entity,NaDa Resource ID) provides a symmet-
ric key for encryption of communication. Depending of the type of
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the 2nd entity only NaDa Authentication can be used if the 2nd en-
tity resides in the the domain of the ISP. If another NaDaNode is
addressed a trusted ticket (Node Authentication, NaDa Get T icket,
Node Authentication) has to be used. The information in which do-
main the entity resides is part of the NaDa Meta Data.
• NaDa Register (NaDaManagment) During the boot pro-
cess NodeManagement sends a registration message to to
NaDaManagement after authentication. NaDaManagement
responds with NaDa Configure to provide the node with the latest
policy information.
• NaDa Compute Key (NaDa Resource ID) computes key for stor-
age encryption bound to current platform state and to the AppSlice
determined by NaDa Resource ID.
• NaDa Get Key (NaDa Resource ID) Get key for storage encryption
bound to a certain AppSlice defined by NaDa Resource ID.
• Nada Start P2P (NaDa Meta Data,NaDa Resource ID) starts
the P2P protocol to download NaDa Content described
by NaDa Meta Data using the overlay net described by
NaDa Resource ID. For every communication NaDa Connect
has to be used to access the overlay net.
Figure 2 explains the usage of the primitives to realize the overlay net
used for communication between NaDa Nodes in the case of a centralized
NaDa Managment. ”rid” denotes the NaDa Resource ID labeling the
overlay net. To hide the structure of the net NaDa Nodes use the primitive
NaDa Connect (which is not depicted in this diagramm) to establish a con-
nection either with NaDa Authentication or with Node Authentication.
Node Authentication uses the primitives NaDa Authentication and
NaDa Get Key for getting the ticket to establish a connection to a second
node.
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Figure 2: Overlay Net Constitution
2.2 Putting Node into Service
The following steps describe the process of setting up a (new) STB into a
NaDa platform.
1. Node reboot
2. Mutual authentication (NaDa Authentication)
NaDaManagement↔ NodeManagement
3. NaDa Register NodeManagement→ NaDaManagement
4. In certain time intervals: NaDa Log (NaDa Measure Data)
NodeMonitoring → NaDaManagement to provide incentive mecha-
nisms.
5. For all AppSlices NaDaManagement performs the following actions.
• Read App Slice Policy(NaDa Resource ID) from
TrustedDataStore
• Disable traffic between new slice and all other slices not autho-
rized by App Slice Policy.
• Configure overlay network according to the policy.
• Assign encrypted block device Node Store(NaDa Resource ID)
to AppSlice. The key from the corresponding App Slice Policy
is used for encryption.
• Boot AppSlice image.
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2.3 App Slice Installation
The installation of a customer AppSlices is performed in the following steps:
1. NaDa Meta Data NaDaManagement→ NodeManagement
2. NodeManagement:
Nada Start P2P (NaDa Meta Data,NaDa Management ID). The
following primitives are used between entities which are used in the
DFDs for STRIDE analysis:
• NaDa Authentication NodeManagement ↔
NaDaManagement
• NaDa Get T icket NodeManagement↔ NaDaManagement
• Node Authentication NodeManagement↔ NodeManagement
• NaDa Content NodeManagement↔ NaDaManagement
• NaDa Content NodeManagement↔ NodeManagement
3. After the slice is downloaded and the fingerprint ist checked
NodeManagement installs the slice:
• Install Xen image
• Create App Slice Configuration using policy delivered with
AppSlice.
• Disable traffic between new slice and all other slices not autho-
rized by policy delivered with AppSlice.
• Configure overlay network according to the policy.
• Create key (bound to current state) for encryption of virtual block
device (NodeStore) connected with the AppSlice and store key
in the corresponding AppSliceConfiguration.
• Store AppSliceConfiguration in TrustedDataStore tagged by
NaDa Resource ID.
• Assign block device (NodeStore) to AppSlice.
• Boot slice.
4. App Log(App Slice fingerprint and policy) NodeManagement →
AppSlice
2.4 User Requests - Content Download
This scenario considers an (end) user requesting, through an user interface,
access to a multimedia content stored on a NaDa STB which in turn may
be located in her domicile.
10
1. APP User Request (for content) User → UI(NodeManagement)
2. APP User Request UI(NodeManagement)→ AppSlice
3. NaDa Log(APP User Request,time stamp) NodeManagement →
AppSlice: (signed by ISP)
4. AppSlice start P2P download (overlay net configured by
NodeManagement and NaDaManagement otherwise transpar-
ent for NodeManagement)
5. APP User Response (AppSlice → UI(NaDaManagement), if con-
tent, or certain part of content is downloaded)
6. APP User Request User → UI(NodeManagement): (e.g. Play)
7. APP User Request UI(NodeManagement) → AppSlice: (e.g.
Play)
8. NaDa Log(APP User Request,time stamp) NodeManagement →
AppSlice: (signed by ISP)
9. NodeManagement → AppSlice (in defined time intervals):
NaDa Log(play,time stamp) signed by ISP
10. APP User Request User → UI(NodeManagement): (e.g. Stop)
11. APP User Request UI(NodeManagement) → AppSlice: (e.g.
Stop)
12. NaDa Log(APP User Request,time stamp) NodeManagement →
AppSlice: (signed by ISP)
2.5 Monitoring as Support for Operation and Management
Tasks
We consider the following three sub-scenarios in which the basic NaDa mon-
itoring approach (see D1.1 [12], section 3.3) is deployed for the purpose of
monitoring operational and management tasks. The rationale behind this
rests on the fact that, ISPs may want to monitor all NaDa related network
traffic and resource access/consumption in order to improve (or at least
permanently guarantee) the operational stability and reliability of its plat-
form. In such a context, there are interested in gathering STBs and slices
related measurements (e.g. performance or anomalies) which are then made
available to different stakeholders (e.g. content providers or eventually end
users).
As examples of operation and management tasks, we consider the fol-
lowing three use-cases: Firstly, the low-cost resources (re-) allocation in the
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NaDa Platform, secondly the proactive and automatic detection of anoma-
lies and load peaks, and finally the control of isolation between slices. These
three perspectives on operation tasks pinpoint the relevance of monitoring as
process which, on one hand provides inputs for the analysis and the improve-
ment of the quality assurance (failure detection, maintenance, performance
tuning) especially in video-on-demand context, and on the other hand helps
reducing the network access cost.
2.5.1 Low-cost resources (re-) allocation
A persistent and global view of resources consumption and availability is
fundamental for performing a flexible resources (e.g. available free slices,
bandwidth or storage capability) allocation to content providers (i.e. their
respective slices) in the NaDa platform. The allocation task in turn mainly
relies on information collected by the NaDa monitoring processes. Here,
a CP that operates slices in geographically distributed nodes, for instance
across Europe is interested to know the state of health (e.g. running applica-
tions, security configuration and link utilization) of its nodes, characteristics
of network paths between the nodes (e.g. reachability, delay, available band-
width), and the current configuration/properties of its slices (e.g. memory,
storage and computational utilization). Based on these information, the
CP then identifies and analyzes the service popularity in a particular region
(i.e. portion of the NaDa network). The gained knowledges allow CP to
dynamically adapt its content distribution flow w.r.t end users preferences
(e.g. based on service popularity), STB and slices configuration and actual
SLA (which has been renegotiated in order for instance to allow CP to pur-
chase more resources in the targeted NaDa network’s portion). Based on
the collected Information, the pre-loading strategies considered in NaDa is
specified and implemented.
2.5.2 Proactive and automatic detection of anomalies and load
peaks
Beside the support of an efficient resources (re-) allocation, the observation
of both network anomalies (e.g. indication of DDOS, failure of STB) and
workload peaks is highly important for security, platform and resource man-
agement purposes. In this context, the required information are collected
platform-wide, for instance (i) in a portion of the NaDa network or (ii) inside
a hardware module (e.g. STB, residential gateway, DSL-Line Access Mul-
tiplexer, IP backbone). Here, a near real time notification and reporting of
failure provides a significant level of flexibility, e.g. it allows the CP to auto-
matically adapt to the new situation through the reconfiguration or isolation
of both hardware and slices. The ISP is therefore interested to have both
a historical and statistical view of platform’s behavior (inclusive anomalies,
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CP related resources consumption or even illicit attempts to obtain more
resources).
2.5.3 Isolation management
Since one central aspect of NaDa is to provide different CPs with the abil-
ity to carry their respective application slices on the same NaDa node, it
is crucial from their point of view to rely on strict but flexible isolation of
rivals applications. Considering the case in which for instance Warner Bros
Entertainment1 and Vivendi2 have slices located on the same node. Here
each provider is be allowed to access and collect any of their slices related
properties (e.g. storage utilization). In absence of suitable, access con-
trol mechanisms and well-defined isolation between the different Monitoring
flows, Warner Bros Entertainment may gain access to monitoring logs in
which for instance the link utilization of the common host node is reported.
This information does not only provide a view on the common node, at a
given time, but also details for instance about services offered by Vivendi.
Through an analysis of link utilization data, Warner Bros Entertainment
can then gain access to business strategic information like statistics about
services type and popularity, or the geographical region of interest of ser-
vices offered by its competitor, Vivendi. Additionally monitoring processes
furnish both NaDa and Node Management required inputs about a STB’s
state, allocated resources and workload of each application slices. Based on
such information, the management modules then enforces isolation between
slices, i.e., prohibition of non authorized access to sensitive competitors’
data or to access platform’s resources.
3 Security Requirements and assumptions
The NaDa security architecture is based on several security requirements
derived from the use cases. In the design of the security architecture dif-
ferent assumptions on security functionalities are done. In the following
sections security requirements and assumptions relevant for the architecture
are presented.
3.1 Security Requirements
The following high level security requirements for the NaDa architecture
form the determining factor for the identification of threats and the appro-
priate mitigation techniques when the STRIDE analysis is conducted:
1http://www.warnerbros.com/
2http://www.vivendi.com/
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• Isolation of App Slices corresponding to the policies defined by the
customers must be ensured. Mandatory access control to network and
to customer content has to be enforced according to these policies
(Authentication, Authorization, Virtualization).
• Customer content must be protected against manipulation and ille-
gal access during network transfer and storage on NaDa nodes (Data
Integrity, Confidentiality).
• Customers must be enabled to set up secure accounting (Non-
repudiation services).
• Nodes participating in the NaDa network must perform attestation, to
report the integrity of the software running on these nodes (Platform
Integrity).
• Customer software should only be activated after checking the corre-
sponding ISP certificate (Authenticity).
• Correctness and Integrity of Monitoring Data: Requestor should have
the confidence that the monitoring data reported are indeed what
was monitored. The accuracy of the information reported has to be
guarantee, since inaccurate data may lead to bad analysis results. Such
guarantee may rely on one hand on the monitor’s ability to measure
and report accurate data and on the other hand on the controller’s
ability to verify authenticity and freshness of reported data. It may
be assumed that unauthentic or unnecessary data are filtered by the
controller before storage in the central MIB.
• Confidentiality and Fine-grained Access Control: As NaDa consid-
ers outputs of monitoring processes as vital inputs for operational
and management tasks (i.e. real-time performance analysis and trou-
bleshooting) and such inputs as highly sensitive from the point of view
of ISPs and CPs, confidentiality and access control methods have to be
integrated within all phases of the monitoring process. The confiden-
tiality has to be ensured from the early stage of the data collection up
to the reporting and disclosure phases. The Collector orchestrating the
data collection has to rely on encryption primitive or anonymization
technique in order to allow a confidential reporting of sensitive moni-
toring data. The anonimization or encryption of such data has to be
performed without loss of effectiveness and without a deterioration of
quality and accuracy of collected data. A de-anonymisation or deen-
cryption of stored data should only be possible for components and
processes with appropriate (cryptographic) credentials. On the other
hand, access control methods may rely on attributes (NaDa resource
identifier or role), platform integrity or slice’s level of trust, ensuring
14
that only legitimate and authorized entities can access the collected
measurements.
Since the nodes are operated in different environments different security
requirements are given for these nodes from the point of view of the ISP and
of the Customer.
From the point of view of the ISP it’s very important to avoid product
recall or cost-intensive service for NaDa Nodes. Also the ISP must give guar-
anty that App Slices of different customers are strictly isolated. Thus it’s in
the interest of the ISP to control installed App Slices and their updates. If
for instance exploits enabling elevation of privileges for virtual images would
be emerged it should not be possible for customers to install software using
these exploits. Thus only App Slices signed by the ISP should be installed
on NaDa Nodes in the field.
The situation is somewhat different for NaDa Nodes under control of the
customer. Trust boundaries between App Slices of different customers run-
ning on the same node do not exist in this case. Injection of content must
be possible for these nodes. The main requirement is to restrict the access
of the corresponding App Slices to the corresponding overlay net defined
by the resource identifier of the APP Slices. Thus the integrity of the re-
source identifier of the corresponding App Slices has to be assured to prevent
breaking out of the overlay net. To ensure this requirement the customer
software of these specialized nodes also has to be certified by the ISP. Other
solutions where uncertified hardware and software is utilized would require
control possibilities for access to the overlay net of these entities. Various so-
lutions, also depending from the contract between ISP and customer, would
be possible but are out of scope of this analysis.
The permission to install updates on App Slices for customers would
exclude the possibility for the ISP to check the integrity of the App Slice
software installed on the nodes. Thus arbitrary manipulation of App Slice
software by users would be alleviated.
A detailed discussion on the security requirements relevant for the NaDa
scenarios can be found in D1.1 [12] [8] [3] [2] and [6].
3.2 Security Assumptions
For the scenarios presented in section 2 following assumptions apply:
• Sensitive data, like private ISP keys, App Slice fingerprints, and App
slice images to be delivered will be protected by the ISP. The corre-
sponding measures will not be part of this threat analysis.
• Manipulation of the software e.g. due to a buffer overflow can’t be
prevented.
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• Customer IDs and App Slice IDs must be part of the tickets com-
puted by the trusted peer to peer protocol, to provide addressing
of Node Management and App Slices and also for the configuration
of the overlay network. This address information will be stored in
“NaDa Resource ID” used in MSC Figure 4 (Step 1, as “resource”)
of the trusted peer to peer protocol defined in [7]. NaDa Resource is
defined as follows:
NaDa Resource := (Node Management ID, nil) | APP Slice ID
APP Slice ID := (Customer ID,APP ID)
• During boot process of a NaDa Node the internet connection to the ISP
must be available, to register the node and for time synchronization.
• Trusted Platform Administrator: The designed isolation administrator
and NaDa platform manager is trusted to access and process sensible
platform and applications’ metering data. Those managers act in ac-
cordance with their costumers’ security preferences.
• Correct hardware: The underlying hardware (e.g. TPM, CPU-chip,
I/O and storage devices, etc.) behaves in accordance with the specifi-
cations and standards.
• Trusted TCB and reliable Isolation: The virtualization engines as well
as other components of the trusted computing base of the NaDa mon-
itoring architecture are correct and behave as specified.
• No advanced physical attacks: We have assumed that the underlying
hardware included in the NaDa Monitoring Architecture are resilient
against such type of attacks.
4 High level model
The high level model for the NaDa architecture is composed of the node
architecture including the communication of the interactions between the
respective components on the one hand and the security model for the mon-
itoring modules. The monitoring modules are situated and operated based
on the node architecture as an independent service. In the following chapters
these two models are presented.
4.1 Node architecture model and interactions
As presented in [8][12][13] the architecture of the NaDa infrastructure is
based on the P2P paradigm allowing for a highly available infrastructure by
16
Figure 3: High level architecture for the distribution of content
distributing some of the core functionalities into the nodes installed. The
resulting high level architecture is depicted in Figure 3 and consists of the
node and its supporting infrastructure. Mainly two players’ components are
shown there. The customer is represented by its slice and the corresponding
centralized application tracker as well as its support by the customers Iden-
tity Provider and the store of content offered by the customer. In Figure 3
only one customer is shown for the sake of simplicity. Additional customers
are duplicating the customer related components.
4.2 Security Mechanisms for the NaDa Monitoring Archi-
tecture
This section describes a secure monitoring infrastructure using trusted com-
puting and virtualization concepts. Both concepts enable trustworthy gen-
eration and storage of monitoring data. The further disclosure of such sen-
sitive data is governed in the proposed architecture by fine grained access
control policies. In order to provide the fine grained access control required
for a large scale use of NaDa, we have integrated XACML [9] components
into the NaDa basic monitoring architecture. The new security mechanisms
extend the architectural view on the basic NaDa Monitoring Architecture
(see D1.1 [12][13] and [8]).
4.2.1 Internal Security and Access Control Mechanisms
The proposed mechanisms ensuring STB internals data protection lever-
age the isolation techniques already introduced (see D1.1 [12][13]) and allow
fine grained access control to monitoring measurements. Such measurements
generated during the active monitoring of a STB as well as during the passive
monitoring of slices running in that STB are temporarily stored in a local
repository which in turn is protected by the means of secure storage (NADA
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Figure 4: High level architecture for the measurement
security primitive NaDa Compute Key and NaDa Get Key as defined in sec-
tion 5.1.3). Previously to their storage the monitoring data are signed by
the Node Management relying on trusted time stamps as specified by the
NaDa Log primitive 5.1.3. Any request from a slice for internal measure-
ments is handled by the Node Management, which is internally responsible
to authenticate request for local measurements and to restrict access to lo-
cally stored monitoring data. The request and access to monitoring data
are performed with respect to authentication, authorization (section 4.2.2)
and confidential disclosure of monitoring data.
Figure 5 depicts the relevant security components and modules of the
STB focusing on the protection of measurements locally stored.
In the following a description of those components and modules as well
as their respective contributions to secure the internal monitoring process is
provided. The first two modules (monitor and local MIB) basically extents
the functions of the Node Monitoring initially introduced in D1.1 [12][13]
section 3.1.
Monitor The monitor deployed in each NaDa node (STB) is responsible
for triggering active measurements from this node and for passively moni-
toring slices running in the node. It captures several types of node and slices
related information, protects them according to (NaDa and slices) policies
and delivers them to monitoring service. Relying on traditional tools (e.g.
CACTI [4], Nagios [1] or Munin [11]) which in turn use standards like PR-
SCTP or IPFIX, the monitor initiates the collection of host node, network
characteristics as well as slices related metering data.
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Figure 5: Node Intermal Security Components
Local MIB All STB’s and local slices’ measured properties are first stored
in a local MIB. The content of each local MIB is then transferred in the global
MIB. The split between local and global MIB as well as the periodical update
of the gloabl MIB can be considered as a step towards a good compromise
between the need for fresh platform measurements and the monitoring over-
head. The secure storage by means of integrity and confidentiality relies
on primitive for storage encryption bound to the STB’ configuration or to
slice’s state. This process benefits from the combined potentials of TPM
and virtualization as specified in D1.1 [12][13].
VMM VMM primarily provides an abstraction to the underlying hard-
ware resources of the host STB, and defines an isolated execution envi-
ronment for each stored slices. In order to perform the isolation between
application slices running on the same physical NaDa box, the VMM defines
a module which is build as policy enforcement and policy decision point for
a wide range of low-level security policies. For instance this module may
include pre-defined policies that specify which slices are allowed to com-
municate or share resources together and which security requirements the
exchanged messages must satisfy. The specification and enforcement of high-
level (finer-grained) access control requirements for the temporarily stored
local measurements will be handled by the node monitoring.
TPM We refer to the TPM as hardware-based trust anchor inside the STB
(see D1.1 [12][13]). The overall security mechanisms for the NaDa Monitor-
ing make use of its potential for several purposes e.g., for a trustworthy
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Figure 6: Internals Monitoring Process
collection of boxes and slices properties, and for ensuring a continuous chain
of trust/integrity up to the slices, and
4.2.2 Internal Monitoring Process
The workflow for requesting internal monitoring data (e.g. performance of
host box or characteristics of co-located slices) is depicted in Figure 6 and
described as follows:
• First of all, a slice S1 requests measurement data (Log Request and
Log Response in 5.1.3). Upon receiving this request, the Node Man-
agement applying the isolation policy also performs internal access
control to the local MIB. This involves evaluating the slice’s request
by means of authentication (cf. relying on slice’s unique identifier
APP Slice ID). As result of this step, Node Management which is de-
signed as Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) validates S1’s level of trust
and allows the request to be forwarded (asking for an authorization
decision) to the Node Monitoring (steps 1-3).
• Node Monitoring designed as Policy Decision Point (PDP) then per-
forms access authorization providing the required finer granularity of
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access control. This involves requesting policy rules and obligations
from the policy repository. Based on these policies and other secu-
rity context (e.g. trust level of slice or current state of the STB) the
Node Monitoring generates an authorization (permit or deny) decision
which is then transferred to the Node Management(PEP) (steps 4-6).
• Finally, the PDP’s decision is enforced by the PEP (i.e. Node Manage-
ment) which unseals (relying on NaDa Get Key) the local MIB from
the secure storage, queries and transfers the targeted measurements
information to S1 (steps 7-9).
4.2.3 External Security Mechanisms
As shown in Figure 7, this section considers mechanisms to enforce security
requirements of a central component of the NaDa Monitoring Architecture:
The monitoring server. The resulting security methods aim at providing
the primitive to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the monitoring
data from the reporting by STBs up to their storage in the global MIB
and their dissemination by the Monitoring Server. As result we extend
the functionalities of monitoring server’s main component as defined in the
following paragraphs.
Secure Reporting In our extension, Node Monitoring reports the mon-
itoring measurements as encrypted data. The secure reporting by means
of encryption and digital signature mainly relies on NaDa Connect primi-
tive for building the encrypted communication channel between monitoring
in STB and Controller in monitoring server. The controller module of the
monitoring server on the other hand decrypts the received measurement val-
ues, performs the orchestration and stores the plain-text data in the MIB.
Previously to the encryption and decryption, both entities performed a bidi-
rectional authentication (using the Node Authentication primitive) as well
as the negotiation of the symmetric key used to encrypt or decrypt the
reported measurement.
Global Access Control Mechanisms The global access control mech-
anisms tailor the XACML Framework [9]to our purpose. The resulted ar-
chitecture is depicted in Figure 7 and mainly includes four components:
Controller, MIB, Exporter which is design as PEP and PDP, and a Policy
Manager which is designed to be in charge of the security policies governing
the access to the MIB.
Although Figure 7 depicts a centralized access control approach describ-
ing the four components as part of a single central entity, we stress that
these components can also be physically distributed throughout the NaDa
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Figure 7: Extended NaDa Monitoring Service Architecture
network. The following subparagraphs detail the functionalities of each of
these components.
Controller Besides its ability to require measurements from different
STB (i.e. monitors) and orchestrate all the measurement collection the
Controller can also use en-/decryption primitives (NaDa Compute Key and
NaDa Get Key) to store the collected measurements as clear text in the
global MIB. The required guarantee that the monitoring server interacts
with the correct STB (i.e. the box is trustworthy and belong to the cor-
rect ISP domain) is provided when relying on NaDa Authentication and
Node Authentication primitive (see 5.1.3).
(Global) MIB This repository stores all STB’ and Network measure-
ments. These data are protected by means of encrypted storage which is
bound to trust state and configuration of the monitoring server. We rely
for this purpose on a set of functions specified by the TCG i.e., integrity
reporting and attestation, (un-) sealing and (un-) binding functions among
others (see D1.1 [12][13] Section 2.3.2). Thus, the MIB can only be available
if no change has been detected in the configuration of the monitoring server
(i.e. the server and its measurement information data base have not been
subject of security attacks, and the integrity of the stored monitoring data
remains intact).
Exporter We extent the Exporter Module with a set of entities and
functional components that allow authorization decisions to be made and
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enforced based on security credentials (e.g. certified requester’s attributes)
and in accordance to access control policies. In the following an overview of
the PEP and PDP roles of the Exporter is presented.
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) - The Exporter is the entity where
the external query for monitoring data arrive. It authenticates the
queries and enforces the decision made by PDP’s decision. The PEP
must be able to intercept any request, for monitoring data, between
Application Controller or NaDa Management and the Exporter. It
should be noted that, the technical implementation of the PEP must
be performed such that the PEP cannot be bypassed in order to access
the protected MIB.
• Policy Decision Point (PDP) - As PDP the Exporter makes decisions
to authorize access. The PDP uses the access control policies from
the PAP as well as additional information (context information, e.g.
slice’s trust level or server current configuration) in order to evaluates
policies and make a decision to authorize access to the local MIB.
The authorization decision process also relies on other components like
for instance the context handler, which are for simplicity reasons not shown
in Figure 7. As part of controlling access to the MIB, the Exporter also
performs request evaluation/ authentication as already pointed out in the
basic Monitoring architecture (see D1.1 [12][13]). It therefore integrates
the authentication function and primitives provided by the cryptographic
module (see below).
Policy Manager This entity is designed as XACML Policy Admin-
istration Point (PAP) which is basically the entity that creates storages
and manages all access control policies used by the PDP (i.e. Exporter).
These policies consist of decision rules, conditions, and other constraints for
accessing the data stored in the global MIB. The policy manager specifies ac-
cess control policies with respect to the level of confidentiality required for
monitoring information (neutral or sensitive), and security affiliation and
credentials of the requester. Furthermore, the policy manager specifies con-
ditions and obligations for access control policies (e.g. log any request and
access to MIB for accountability purposes) allowing a deployment in a vast
range of use-cases. This will provide the basis for future security auditing.
Cryptographic Module This module includes a TPM and other
cryptographic and key management primitives. It therefore provides, val-
idates, and maintains the cryptographic keys which are used by the data
protection mechanisms enforced by the Exporter. For these purposes, the
interaction with an external Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is considered.
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Figure 8: External Monitoring Process
In addition it provides along with the authentication primitive defined in
section 5.1.3. the required inputs for trust negotiation between access re-
quester and monitoring server, especially when the monitoring server needs
slice to provide authentic credentials/attributes for authorization decision.
4.2.4 External Monitoring Process
This process is relevant for Application Controller and NaDa Management
which need information related to the performance/status of any NaDa box
or related to (owned) slices stored somewhere on the NaDa platform. Figure
8 shows the integration of security mechanisms described above and differen-
tiate between two subprocesses: Secure measurement collection and secure
measurement export.
Secure Measurement Collection (Report) The steps included in this
subprocess are depicted in the left Block of Figure 8.
• In the first step, the Monitoring Server (through its Controller mod-
ule) contacts the Monitor inside a STB and request measurements
(Log Request)(step I).
• In order to guarantee authenticity and confidentiality, both Con-
troller and Monitor engage in a bidirectional authentication
(Node Authentication) and negotiate a symmetric key for encrypted
communication (NaDa Connect). The monitor then transmits STB’s
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measurements (Log Response) as ciphertext to the Collector (steps II,
III).
• After receiving encrypted measurements, the Controller uses its part
of the symmetric key to decrypt the ciphertext. Afterwards it orches-
trates all data collection, unseals (NaDa Get Key) and updates the
MIB (steps IV, V).
Secure Measurement Export (Global Access Control) The right
block of Figure 8 shows the different steps which composed the Secure Mea-
surement Export.
• At the beginning the NaDa Management or an instance of an Appli-
cation Controller sends a measurement request (Log Request) to the
Exporter, along with its security credentials (step 1).
• The Exporter funding as PEP evaluates the request by means of au-
thentication (Node Authentication) and retrieves authorization rules
from unsealed Policy Repository (step 2, 3).
• Based on these rules and addition information (e.g. current configura-
tion) the Exporter designed as PDP makes a deny/allow decision. In
case it authorizes the access, the targeted measurements are queried
from unsealed MIB and transferred (Log Response) to the NaDa Man-
agement/ Application Controller (step 4, 5).
5 Threat Models
This Deliverable (D3.2) defines the NaDa security architecture based on the
STRIDE methodology given by Microsoft. In the respective section STRIDE
is introduced and the architecture is given. As a mean to verify the design
a second approach is introduced using an abstract functional system model.
Section 5.2 introduces this approach and provides first results later used in
the evaluation as part of D3.4 [14].
5.1 STRIDE methodology and architecture
A threat model of the NaDa architecture, based on STRIDE, a methodol-
ogy introduced by Howard and Lipner in [5], will be presented. STRIDE is
an acronym for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure,
Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege (EoP).
Two use scenarios build the base of the threat model. Data flow diagrams
(DFDs) will be created for the corresponding use cases. All primitives and
the corresponding elements of the NaDa architecture are included in the
DFDs. For every element of a DFD applicable threats will be assigned to
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these elements, according to the stated high level security requirements for
the NaDa architecture. In the next step the threat mitigation techniques
of the NaDa architecture will be assigned to the DFD elements and their
corresponding threats. Finally it can be checked, whether there is a counter-
measure for every expected threat assigned to the DFD. The tables with the
measurement assignment can be used as a checklist for the implementation
and code review of the security mechanisms of the NaDa components.
5.1.1 Differences to STRIDE Methodology
Table 1 shows the mapping of threats to DFD elements proposed in [5]. This
mapping was inappropriate for several reasons:
• The abstraction level for processes required different measures against
spoofing depending on the corresponding data flow entities. So spoof-
ing was also assigned to data flows.
• Also repudiation was assigned to data flows in opposite to the standard
way of proceeding, because all actions related to this threat could be
mapped exactly to one data flow entity. Repudiation was not consid-
ered for external entities and processes. For data stores and processes
tempering was checked for entities involved in the corresponding data
flow.
Figure 9 shows the modified workflow for the performed STRIDE anal-
ysis. Use Scenarios were developed on base of the high level architecture
described in [7].
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Table 1: Mapping STRIDE Threats to DFD Element Types
DFD Element Type S T R I D E
External Entity X X
Data Flow X X X
Data Store X X X X
Process X X X X X X
5.1.2 External Dependencies
Components of the system running on NaDa nodes
• A TPM crypto processor will be used on NaDa nodes.
• Ubuntu hypervisor running Xen will be used as virtualization technol-
ogy to run NaDa management and App Slices.
• The sHype [15] hypervisor security architecture will be used to control
information flow between App Slices sharing a single NaDa Node.
27
• Authentication and Attestation, thus the realization of the overlay net-
work, and the NaDa P2P protocol will be based on an implementation
of a trusted P2P protocol described in [7].
• Beside his own implementation of a P2P protocol the customer has
to implement an interface to be able to receive commands from Node
Management, and to deliver APP Content:
– APP User Request for user interaction
– APP Log to receive accounting information from Node Manage-
ment
5.1.3 DFDs
All primitives and data exchanged between NaDa components are included
in the following data flow diagrams (DFD). Data flows not going through
trust boundaries are depicted with dashed arrows. For all other data flows
trust boundaries are crossed. Trust boundaries exist for data flows between
components with different privileges. E.g. an App Slice has lower privileges
than Node Management. To achieve better clarity in Figure 10 the DFD is
divided into two subdiagramms.
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Figure 10: DFDs
Table 2: DFD Elements
External Entities E1 User
Processes P1.1 Node Management
P1.2 Node Monitoring
P1.3 UI (Node Management)
P2 NaDa Management
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P3 APP Slice
Data Stores D1 NaDa Store
D2 Node Store
D3 Trusted Data Store
Data Flows F0 NaDa Policy P1.1 → P1.3
F1.1 NaDa Register P1.1 → P2
F1.2 NaDa Meta Data P2 → P1.1
F2.1 NaDa Authentication P2 ↔ P1.1
F2.2 NaDa Get Ticket P2 ↔ P1.1
F2.3 Node Authentication P1.1 ↔ P1.1 2
F3.1 NaDa Content P2 ↔ P1.1
F3.2 App Content P1.1 ↔ P1.1 2
F3.3 NaDa Content P1.1 ↔ P1.1 2
F3.4 App Content P3 ↔ D2
F3.5 App Content P3 → P1.3
F4.1 APP User Request E1 → P1.3
F4.2 App Content P1.3 → E1
F5.1 APP User Request P1.3 → P3
F5.2 Log Request P3 → P1.1
F5.3 Log Response P1.1 → P3
F6.1 App Slice Data D3 ↔ P1.1
F7 NaDa Content D1 → P2
F8 App Content P3 ↔ P1.1
F9 App Content P1.1 2 ↔ P3 2
Table 3: Threats to the System
Threat Type DFD Item Number
Spoofing External Entities: E1
Processes: P1.1, P1.2, P1.3, P2, P3
Data Flows: F0, F1.1, F1.2, F2.1, F2.2, F2.3, F3.1, F3.2, F3.3,
F3.4, F3.5, F4.1, F4.2, F5.1, F5.2, F5.3, F7, F8
Tampering Processes: P1.1, P1.2, P1.3, P2, P3
Data Stores: D1, D2, D3
Data Flows: F0, F1.1, F1.2, F2.1, F2.2, F2.3, F3.1, F3.2, F3.3,
F3.4, F3.5, F4.1, F4.2, F5.1, F5.2, F5.3, F6.1, F7, F8, F9
Repudiation Data Flows: F3.4, F3.5, F4.1, F4.2, F5.1, F5.2, F5.3, F8
Information Disclosure Processes: P1.1, P1.2, P1.3, P2, P3
Data Stores: D1, D2, D3
Data Flows: F0, F1.1, F1.2, F2.1, F2.2, F2.3, F3.1, F3.2, F3.3,
F3.4, F3.5, F4.1, F4.2, F5.1, F5.2, F5.3, F6.1, F7, F8, F9
EoP Processes: P3
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Plan Mitigations Table 4 lists high level mitigation techniques proposed
in [7]:
Table 4: High Level Mitigation Techniques
Threat Typ Mitigation Technique
Spoofing Authentication
Tampering Integrity
Repudiation Non-repudiation services
Information disclosure Confidentiality
DoS Availability
EoP Authorization
In [8] mitigation techniques provided by the NaDa platform were pre-
sented in textual form. In the next step the measures described in this paper
were divided into “atomic” measures. This partitioning allows to assign sin-
gle measures to STRIDE threats and in the next step to the table where
DFD elements are assigned to these steps. Isolation of App slices and the
access control to physical resources will be assured by virtualization. Virtu-
alization is not listed as specific mitigation technique in the following table.
Only measures necessary to control interfaces of the virtual images and to
enforce the NaDa policies will be listed. Also Trusted Platform Module will
not be listed as an “atomic” mitigation technique.
Table 5: NaDa Measures
Measures
M0.1 ISP responsibility
M0.2 Customer responsibility
M0.3 ** No measure **
M1 Mandatory access control in hypervisor (sHype)
M2 Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
M3 Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
M4.0 Create signed log entry with trusted timestamp
M4.1 Send log entry for User Action to APP slice
M4.2 Write log entry for Action to Trusted Data Store
M4.3 Send log entry for Action to NaDa Management
M5 Check fingerprint of APP Slice
M6.1 Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
M6.2 Initialize Trusted Data Store
M6.3 Initialize Node Store
M7.1 Encrypt Trusted Data Store
M7.2 Encrypt Node Stores
M8 ISP Certificate
M9 Remote node attestation
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Table 5: NaDa Measures
Measures
M10 Mutual authentication
M11 Meta data signed by ISP
M12 Encryption of channel
M13 Encryption Overlay Net
M14 App Identifier displayed by ISP
M15 Data stored in Trusted Data Store
M16 e.g. HDMI digital content protection
M17 e.g. Digital watermarking
M18 Don’t store data worthy to be protected in this entity
M19 Correct assignment of Resource ID to AppSlice
M1 sHype stands for secure hypervisor. sHype is a hypervisor security
architecture developed by IBM Research available for XEN virtualiza-
tion. sHype supports policy-based information flow control for virtual
machines. Two standard policies ”Chinese Wall” and ”Simple Type
Enforcement” are available. It’s possible to define coalitions which can
share resources. sHype types are used in these policies and define the
granularity for App Slice coalitions and the available resources (App
Stores). NaDa policies must define the mapping of NaDa Resource IDs
to these types. For mandatory access control to App Stores simple
type enforcement policy will be used (App Slices can use resources
with equal types). So according to customer policies isolation from
resources of other customers can be enforced, and the sharing of re-
sources between different App Slices can be permitted. The policy
defined by the customer has to be verified by the ISP. Only certified
policies will be used to configure access rights of App slices.
M2 Virtualization is used to isolate App Slices according to policies de-
fined by the customers. The network connections of APP Slices are
critical parts of the architecture respective to breaking these policies.
A standard framework (e.g. iptables) has to be used to control net-
work traffic between different App Slices by the privileged domain of
the NaDa Node. The default firewall rules have to enforce strict sep-
aration of App Slices. Customer policies allowing communication of
different App Slices on the same node have to be certified by the ISP.
M3 There are two types of ”overlay nets” . The overlay net which is used
to exchange Nada Content ( App Slices, updates) and the overlay
nets for customer applications. Beside the IP addresses the NaDa
resource identifier (see 2.1) is used to address entities in the NaDa
Network and to define the structure of the overlay net. Only one spe-
cific resource identifier is used to address NaDa entities in the network.
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Thus there is one NaDa specific overlay net which can be used by all
NaDa entities for maintenance purposes. The NaDa resource iden-
tifier must be different from customer resource identifiers. The cus-
tomer defines the policy which other applications (identified by their
NaDa Resource ID) can use a certain resource (App Slice). This pol-
icy is delivered to NaDa nodes together with App Slice images. Thus
this policy implicitly defines the structure of the overlay net and also
has to be verified and certified by the ISP before installation. Base for
the communication in the overlay net is the “trusted ticket” computed
in the last step of the trusted P2P protocol presented in [7]. Addi-
tional to the verification of the ticket the policy for accessing NaDa
resources has to be checked with the NaDa Resource ID which is part
of the ticket. A symetric key for encryption can be computed after the
ticket is delivered to the addressed node and the remote attestation of
this node is performed successfully.
M4.0 A non-repudiation service must exist to produce trusted log data with
timestamps. Trusted log would not possible without performing time
synchronization during boot process. Time synchronization must be
repeated in certain time intervals to avoid inaccuracies. Log entries
have to be signed with a key derived from the root of trust of the NaDa
Node.
M4.1 Log entries collected by the ISP have to be created according to M4.0.
Depending on log policy. The log entries must be written to Trusted
Data Store or have to be sent to NaDa Monitoring.
M4.2, M4.3 Log entries collected by the ISP have to be created according
to M4.0. Depending on log policy The log entries must be written to
Trusted Data Store or have to be sent to NaDa Monitoring.
M5 The fingerprints of App Slices have to be checked before installation.
The fingerprint is part of the meta file signed by ISP which describes
the NaDa Content to be downloaded.
M6.1 Every code running on a NaDa Node has to be measured before
execution. (for measurement of App Slice code see M5). NaDa Nodes
have to be equipped with platform firmware that must be implicitly
trusted. This firmware has to initialize the root of trust for reporting
(RTR), which accumulates measuring data for loaded code. For other
entities of the NaDa architecture it must be possible to check the
attestation for this measuring data to verify the integrity of the loaded
code.
M6.2 The key for encryption of the Trusted Data Store has to be computed
on the node and must be bound to the attested state of the NaDa Node.
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Thus there must exist a root of trust for storage and the possibility
to bind usage of stored data do measuring data computed in M6.1.
Usage of this key is only permitted in an attested state.
M6.3 A key for encryption of the Node Store has to be computed. This
key has to be stored in Trusted Data Store under the Resource ID of
the corresponding App Slice. So this key is implicitly bound to an
attested state of the platform. Access to Node Store is only possible
with attested software.
M7.1 Trusted data store has to be encrypted to guarantee integrity of
stored policy data, NaDa Management data, and log data.
M7.2 Data of Node Stores assigned to certain App Slices has to be en-
crypted to prevent illegal access to content and to prevent manipula-
tion of customer content.
M8 The ISP certificate is part of the NaDa Management software installed
on the NaDa node before delivery in a trustworthy environment.
M9 Attestation of the actual node configuration and the actual firmware
version to remote parties must be possible. Measuring data computed
in M6.1 will be used for remote attestation.
M10 Mutual authentication between Node Management and NaDa Man-
agement must be provided. In the case of centralized NaDa Manage-
ment the protocol described in MSC Figure 2 of the trusted P2P proto-
col is used. Parts of the NaDa Management could run distributed. In
this case the protocol from MSC Figure 3 must be used. Base for the
mutual authentication are the remote attestation capabilities of the
nodes (M9) and the ISP certificate used to verify messages from the
centralized NaDa Management (M8). A symmetric key for encryption
will be exchanged when this protocol is used.
M11 The metafile describing NaDa specific content has to be signed by ISP
tu guarantee integrity of this content.
M12 Network traffic between centralized NaDa Management and NaDa
Nodes has to be encrypted. The symmetric key computed in M9 is
used for encryption.
M13 Network traffic between NaDa Nodes has to be encrypted. The sym-
metric key computed in M3 is used for encryption.
M14 To avoid spoofing of the user interface for certain App Slices the ISP
should ensure that the identity of the current content provider is pre-
sented for the user, beside the presentation of the data provided by
the content provider.
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M15 All data used by NaDa Management and NaDa Monitoring has to
be stored in Trusted Data Store, to ensure integrity of this data. So
access to data is possible for previously defined software only (M6.1,
M6.2).
M16 For content delivery digital content protection (e.g. HDMI) could be
used.
M17 NaDa will provide capability for digital watermarking in the standard
libraries of App Slices for the content providers.
M18 If a entity is not encrypted do not store secret data in this entity.
M19 Correct assignment of NaDa Resource IDs to App Slices and to
physical resources is essential for correct isolation of App Slices. Parts
of the software performing this assignment should be reviewed, or if
possible investigated using formal methods.
All tables presented in this paper are generated from YAML files
(http//www.yaml.org). YAML is a human friendly data serialization stan-
dard for many programming languages. This offers several opportunities:
• Data could be used to generate specifications for model checking.
• Data could be used for generation of check-lists.
• Data could be used for policy generation.
Also dependencies between single measures are defined in the YAML files
(see Figure 11).
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M4.2:Wri te  log entry  for  Act ion to  Trusted Data  Store
M4.0 :Crea t e  s i gned  l og  en t ry  w i th  t r u s t ed  t imes t amp
M4.3 :Send  log  en t ry  fo r  Act ion  to  NaDa Management M4.1:Send log entry  for  User  Act ion to  APP s l ice
M10:Mutua l  au then t i ca t ion
M11:Meta  da ta  s igned  by  ISP M12:Encrypt ion  of  channe l M3:Trus ted  t i cke t  fo r  access  to  over lay  ne t
M8:ISP Cert i f icate M 9 : R e m o t e  n o d e  a t t e s t a t i o n
M6.1 :Trus ted  Boo t ,  in i t i a l i ze  measur ing  da ta  fo r  loaded  code .
M6.2: In i t ia l ize  Trus ted  Data  Store
M7.1 :Encrypt  Trus ted  Data  S tore
M6.3: In i t ia l ize  Node Store
M7.2 :Encryp t  Node  S to resM13:Encrypt ion Overlay Net
Figure 11: Measure Dependency
Table 6 assigns mitigation techniques provided by the NaDa platform to
the high level mitigation table 4. techniques proposed in [5].
Table 6: NaDa Mitigation Techniques
Mitigation Technique and Measures
Authentication (Spoofing)
M0.2 Customer responsibility
M8 ISP Certificate
M2 Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
M3 Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
M9 Remote node attestation
M14 App Identifier displayed by ISP
M10 Mutual authentication
- F2.1 provides M10
M12 Encryption of channel
M13 Encryption Overlay Net
M1 Mandatory access control in hypervisor (sHype)
M19 Correct assignment of Resource ID to AppSlice
M0.3 ** No measure **
M0.1 ISP responsibility
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Table 6: NaDa Mitigation Techniques
Mitigation Technique and Measures
Integrity (Tampering)
M0.1 ISP responsibility
M7.2 Encrypt Node Stores
M7.1 Encrypt Trusted Data Store
M6.1 Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
M5 Check fingerprint of APP Slice
M9 Remote node attestation
M10 Mutual authentication
- F2.1 provides M10
M12 Encryption of channel
M11 Meta data signed by ISP
- F2.3 provides M11
M13 Encryption Overlay Net
M3 Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
M1 Mandatory access control in hypervisor (sHype)
M19 Correct assignment of Resource ID to AppSlice
M0.3 ** No measure **
M4.0 Create signed log entry with trusted timestamp
M2 Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
Non repudiaton service (Repudiation)
M17 e.g. Digital watermarking
M4.1 Send log entry for User Action to APP slice
M4.0 Create signed log entry with trusted timestamp
M4.3 Send log entry for Action to NaDa Management
Confidentiality (Information Disclosure)
M7.2 Encrypt Node Stores
M7.1 Encrypt Trusted Data Store
M18 Don’t store data worthy to be protected in this entity
M0.1 ISP responsibility
M0.2 Customer responsibility
M12 Encryption of channel
M10 Mutual authentication
- F2.1 provides M10
M13 Encryption Overlay Net
M2 Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
M19 Correct assignment of Resource ID to AppSlice
M16 e.g. HDMI digital content protection
Authorization (EoP)
M1 Mandatory access control in hypervisor (sHype)
M2 Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
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Table 6: NaDa Mitigation Techniques
Mitigation Technique and Measures
M3 Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
Table 7: Assigned Countermeasures
Threat Type DFD Item Number
Spoofing External Entities:
E1: User
- M0.2 : Customer responsibility
Processes:
P1.1: Node Management
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
P1.2: Node Monitoring
P1.3: UI (Node Management)
- M14 : App Identifier displayed by ISP
P2: NaDa Management
- M8 : ISP Certificate
P3: APP Slice
- M2 : Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
Data Flows:
F1.1 - NaDa Register: Node Management → NaDa Management
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F1.2 - NaDa Meta Data: NaDa Management → Node Management
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F2.1 - NaDa Authentication: NaDa Management↔ Node Management
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Table 7: Assigned Countermeasures
Threat Type DFD Item Number
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F2.2 - NaDa Get Ticket: NaDa Management ↔ Node Management
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F2.3 - Node Authentication: Node Management↔Node Management 2
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F3.1 - NaDa Content: NaDa Management ↔ Node Management
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F3.2 - App Content: Node Management ↔ Node Management 2
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F3.3 - NaDa Content: Node Management ↔ Node Management 2
- M13 : Encryption Overlay Net
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded
code.
F3.4 - App Content: APP Slice ↔ Node Store
- M1 : Mandatory access control in hypervisor (sHype)
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Table 7: Assigned Countermeasures
Threat Type DFD Item Number
F3.5 - App Content: APP Slice → UI (Node Management)
- M19 : Correct assignment of Resource ID to AppSlice
F4.1 - APP User Request: User → UI (Node Management)
- M0.2 : Customer responsibility
F4.2 - App Content: UI (Node Management) → User
- M0.3 : ** No measure **
F5.1 - APP User Request: UI (Node Management) → APP Slice
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F5.2 - Log Request: APP Slice → Node Management
- M19 : Correct assignment of Resource ID to AppSlice
F5.3 - Log Response: Node Management → APP Slice
- M19 : Correct assignment of Resource ID to AppSlice
F7 - NaDa Content: NaDa Store → NaDa Management
- M0.1 : ISP responsibility
F8 - App Content: APP Slice ↔ Node Management
- M2 : Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
Tampering Processes:
P1.1: Node Management
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
P1.2: Node Monitoring
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
P1.3: UI (Node Management)
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
P2: NaDa Management
- M0.1 : ISP responsibility
P3: APP Slice
- M5 : Check fingerprint of APP Slice
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
Data Stores:
D1: NaDa Store
- M0.1 : ISP responsibility
D2: Node Store
- M7.2 : Encrypt Node Stores
- M6.3 : Initialize Node Store
- M7.1 : Encrypt Trusted Data Store
- M6.2 : Initialize Trusted Data Store
40
Table 7: Assigned Countermeasures
Threat Type DFD Item Number
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded
code.
D3: Trusted Data Store
- M7.1 : Encrypt Trusted Data Store
- M6.2 : Initialize Trusted Data Store
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
Data Flows:
F1.1 - NaDa Register: Node Management → NaDa Management
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F1.2 - NaDa Meta Data: NaDa Management → Node Management
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M11 : Meta data signed by ISP
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F2.1 - NaDa Authentication: NaDa Management↔ Node Management
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
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Table 7: Assigned Countermeasures
Threat Type DFD Item Number
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F2.2 - NaDa Get Ticket: NaDa Management ↔ Node Management
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F2.3 - Node Authentication: Node Management↔Node Management 2
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F3.1 - NaDa Content: NaDa Management ↔ Node Management
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M11 : Meta data signed by ISP
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M5 : Check fingerprint of APP Slice
F3.2 - App Content: Node Management ↔ Node Management 2
- M13 : Encryption Overlay Net
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded
code.
F3.3 - NaDa Content: Node Management ↔ Node Management 2
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Table 7: Assigned Countermeasures
Threat Type DFD Item Number
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M11 : Meta data signed by ISP
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
- M13 : Encryption Overlay Net
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded
code.
F3.4 - App Content: APP Slice ↔ Node Store
- M1 : Mandatory access control in hypervisor (sHype)
F3.5 - App Content: APP Slice → UI (Node Management)
- M19 : Correct assignment of Resource ID to AppSlice
F4.1 - APP User Request: User → UI (Node Management)
- M0.3 : ** No measure **
F4.2 - App Content: UI (Node Management) → User
- M0.3 : ** No measure **
F5.1 - APP User Request: UI (Node Management) → APP Slice
- M0.3 : ** No measure **
F5.2 - Log Request: APP Slice → Node Management
- M0.3 : ** No measure **
F5.3 - Log Response: Node Management → APP Slice
- M4.0 : Create signed log entry with trusted timestamp
F7 - NaDa Content: NaDa Store → NaDa Management
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F8 - App Content: APP Slice ↔ Node Management
- M2 : Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
F9 - App Content: Node Management 2 ↔ APP Slice 2
Repudiation Data Flows:
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Table 7: Assigned Countermeasures
Threat Type DFD Item Number
F3.4 - App Content: APP Slice ↔ Node Store
F3.5 - App Content: APP Slice → UI (Node Management)
- M17 : e.g. Digital watermarking
F4.1 - APP User Request: User → UI (Node Management)
- M4.1 : Send log entry for User Action to APP slice
- M4.0 : Create signed log entry with trusted timestamp
F4.2 - App Content: UI (Node Management) → User
- M17 : e.g. Digital watermarking
F5.1 - APP User Request: UI (Node Management) → APP Slice
- M4.1 : Send log entry for User Action to APP slice
- M4.0 : Create signed log entry with trusted timestamp
F5.2 - Log Request: APP Slice → Node Management
- M4.0 : Create signed log entry with trusted timestamp
F5.3 - Log Response: Node Management → APP Slice
F8 - App Content: APP Slice ↔ Node Management
- M4.3 : Send log entry for Action to NaDa Management
- M4.0 : Create signed log entry with trusted timestamp
Information Dis-
closure
Processes:
P1.1: Node Management
- M18 : Don’t store data worthy to be protected in this entity
- M18 : Don’t store data worthy to be protected in this entity
P1.2: Node Monitoring
- M18 : Don’t store data worthy to be protected in this entity
P1.3: UI (Node Management)
- M18 : Don’t store data worthy to be protected in this entity
P2: NaDa Management
- M0.1 : ISP responsibility
P3: APP Slice
- M0.2 : Customer responsibility
Data Stores:
D1: NaDa Store
- M7.2 : Encrypt Node Stores
- M6.3 : Initialize Node Store
- M7.1 : Encrypt Trusted Data Store
- M6.2 : Initialize Trusted Data Store
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded
code.
D2: Node Store
- M7.2 : Encrypt Node Stores
- M6.3 : Initialize Node Store
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Table 7: Assigned Countermeasures
Threat Type DFD Item Number
- M7.1 : Encrypt Trusted Data Store
- M6.2 : Initialize Trusted Data Store
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded
code.
D3: Trusted Data Store
- M7.1 : Encrypt Trusted Data Store
- M6.2 : Initialize Trusted Data Store
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
Data Flows:
F1.1 - NaDa Register: Node Management → NaDa Management
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F1.2 - NaDa Meta Data: NaDa Management → Node Management
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F2.1 - NaDa Authentication: NaDa Management↔ Node Management
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F2.2 - NaDa Get Ticket: NaDa Management ↔ Node Management
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F2.3 - Node Authentication: Node Management↔Node Management 2
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F3.1 - NaDa Content: NaDa Management ↔ Node Management
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
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Table 7: Assigned Countermeasures
Threat Type DFD Item Number
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F3.2 - App Content: Node Management ↔ Node Management 2
- M13 : Encryption Overlay Net
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded
code.
F3.3 - NaDa Content: Node Management ↔ Node Management 2
- M13 : Encryption Overlay Net
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded
code.
F3.4 - App Content: APP Slice ↔ Node Store
- M2 : Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
F3.5 - App Content: APP Slice → UI (Node Management)
- M19 : Correct assignment of Resource ID to AppSlice
F4.1 - APP User Request: User → UI (Node Management)
- M16 : e.g. HDMI digital content protection
F4.2 - App Content: UI (Node Management) → User
- M16 : e.g. HDMI digital content protection
F5.1 - APP User Request: UI (Node Management) → APP Slice
- M2 : Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
F5.2 - Log Request: APP Slice → Node Management
- M2 : Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
F5.3 - Log Response: Node Management → APP Slice
- M2 : Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
F7 - NaDa Content: NaDa Store → NaDa Management
- M12 : Encryption of channel
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
F8 - App Content: APP Slice ↔ Node Management
- M2 : Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
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Table 7: Assigned Countermeasures
Threat Type DFD Item Number
F9 - App Content: Node Management 2 ↔ APP Slice 2
EoP Processes:
P3: APP Slice
- M1 : Mandatory access control in hypervisor (sHype)
- M2 : Firewall rules running in the NaDa nodes
- M3 : Trusted ticket for access to overlay net
- M10 : Mutual authentication
- M8 : ISP Certificate
- M9 : Remote node attestation
- M6.1 : Trusted Boot, initialize measuring data for loaded code.
5.2 Abstract functional system model
As a basis for the security requirements analysis, a functional model is de-
rived from the use cases. The nature of the use case descriptions is such that
it is not possible to identify the complete system under investigation. There-
fore an abstract functional component model is developed, which represents
the behaviour of a single node within the system. The model provides an
overview of every action happening at the functional borders of the node, as
well as the interactions with other nodes or with other entities of the system.
Based on the functional component model, one may now start to reason
about the overall system. The synthesis of the inner and the outer sys-
tem behaviour builds the global system behaviour. The distinction between
internal and external flow description regarding the functional component
model is expressed in terms of internal and external functional flow. This
approach is based on the first results provided by the EU FP7 Evita project
and will continue the respective work from the Evita project within NaDa.
The theoretical foundation as presented in the Evita deliverable “D3.1.2:
Security and trust model” will be applied to verify the architecture given in
the previous section.
This should help to illustrate how the component model should be inter-
preted. Of course, an exhaustive list of all possible instances of the system
component models would be too big to be written down. Therefore, the
identification of border actions of the overall system that are relevant to the
security requirements is already performed within the component model.
However, the functional dependencies among several component instances
must still be taken into account during this process.
The work will be complemented by applying the Simple Homomorphism
Verification Tool (SHVT) [10]. As a first preliminary result we performed a
high level analysis on two of the three use cases and present the results in
the following sections
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Figure 12: Use case 1: End User request
Use case 1: End User request The first diagram 123 describes the use
case scenario for end user requests. The arrows show the communication
flow and are numbered sequentially. In contradiction to the descriptions
in [8] we consider the end of the use case with the successful delivery of a
request to the node containing the desired content. Everything after the
receipt of a delivery request is viewed by us as part of the content delivery
use case described later in this document. Note that components that are
involved in the communication are displayed gray and that for the sake of
simplicity we assume only two nodes to be involved in the process although
in distributed P2P context this is generally not the case.
The end user sends out his request, communicating with the
COMM/API of the corresponding node which is show in the diagram above
with the arrow labeled with (1). The COMM/API signs the request and
sends it out to the Node Management (2) which then stores it in the Node
Store (3). After that the COMM/API sends the signed request to the
App Tracker (4) which then provides the Download Definition File to the
COMM/API (5). The COMM/API requests the NADA Tracker with the
DD File (6). The NADA Tracker sends the DD File to the node that con-
tains the desired content in its Slices (7) where the DD-File is processed
by the corresponding COMM/API. At this point the End User request is
delivered and any reaction to the request is assumed to be part of content
distribution use case.
As the above illustrates a system of systems we can already define bound-
aries which are of interest. We can see that the communication that hap-
pens within a node is communication within the system. The first boundary
that is crossed is arrow (4) which marks the border between node and App
3It is to be noted that the interaction between node 2 and the customer infrastructure
is omitted for the sake of simplicity.
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Figure 13: Use case 2: Content Distribution
Tracker. The second boundary is crossed with arrow (6) between node and
NADA Tracker and the third border is crossed with arrow (7) where com-
munication happens between NADA Tracker and another node (instance)
and therefore logically between two nodes (or instances).
Use case 2: Content Distribution The Content Distribution, as de-
picted in Figure 13 begins when a DD File is received at a node in particular
by the node’s COMM/API (7). For simplicity we assume that the desired
content is available at the APP Slice of the receiving node only. Parti-
tioned content distributed over several nodes will be described in another
use case later in this content. Note that the latter case is the usual case in
NADA context where the same content is available at several nodes. The
COMM/API of the node sends the content request directly to the App Slice
(8) in order to receive the desired content from it (9) the encrypted content
is than sent to the COMM/API of the requesting node (10) which stores
the content via Node Management (11) in the Node Store (12).
Within this use case communication takes place between the
COMM/APIs of the nodes involved. These are the boundaries between
the two systems (e.g. instances) which have to be considered.
6 Conclusion
This document presented the NaDa security architecture in context of the
overall system model. A threat analysis was performed identifying the se-
curity relevant aspects and appropriate counter measures. Next steps will
include the following activities:
API definition Based on the system model, abstract types, and primitives
49
a API will be defined. The security implications given by the threat
analysis are providing the frame for the development.
Implementation Given the API a functional demonstrator will be im-
plemented showing the basic security functions. For a possible code
review the checklists presented will be used.
Verification Using the methodology from section 5.2 leads to a model used
to verify certain secuity relevant system functionalities.
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